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Research into resting-state cognition has often struggled with the challenge of
assessing inner experience in the resting state. We employed Descriptive Experience
Sampling (DES), a method aimed at generating detailed and high-fidelity descriptions of
experience, to investigate how experience in the resting state can vary between internal,
external, and multiple simultaneous streams. Using a large body of experiential and
brain activation data acquired from five DES participants, independent raters classified
sampled moments of experience according to whether they were internally directed,
externally directed, or contained elements of both at the same time. In line with existing
models, comparison of internal with external experience samples identified a network
of regions associated with the default mode network. Regions of interest resulting
from the whole-brain contrasts successfully predicted independent raters’ forced-choice
categorizations of samples for which experience had a simultaneous internal and
external focus. The present study is distinctive in tying neural activations in the resting
state to detailed descriptions of specific phenomenology, and in demonstrating how
the DES method enables a particularly nuanced analysis of moments of experience,
especially their ability simultaneously to incorporate both an internal and an external
focus. The study represents an integration of rich phenomenology and characterizations
of brain activity, tracing interpretive paths from phenomenology to neural activation and
vice versa.
Keywords: resting state, fMRI, default mode network, frontal-parietal network, dorsal attention network,
stimulus-independent thought, mind-wandering
INTRODUCTION
There has been a significant growth of interest in studying the brain when participants are not
engaged in any particular task (so-called resting-state measurements). An increased understanding
of resting-state brain networks has proved valuable for theorizing about a range of psychological
phenomena, including autobiographical memory (Spreng et al., 2009), social cognition
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(Spunt et al., 2015), and hallucinations (Alderson-Day et al.,
2016). Resting-state studies report brain activity in a consistent
network of regions, including lower precuneus, superior and
inferior anterior medial frontal regions, and posterior lateral
parietal cortices (Gusnard and Raichle, 2001). The consistency
with which activity in these brain regions decreases during tasks
and increases during rest has led to the notion of a so-called
“default mode” network (DMN) of the brain (Buckner et al.,
2008).
This growth of interest in the brain’s resting-state networks has
been paralleled by an increase of interest in cognitive processes
that are not stimulated by any particular external stimuli,
commonly referred to as mind-wandering (Callard et al., 2013).
To date, efforts to link such “stimulus-independent” cognitions
to their underlying neural states have been hampered by the
difficulty of capturing descriptions of ongoing cognitive states in
sufficient fidelity, richness, and detail.
One method for assessing subjective experience in the
scanner involves asking participants to fill in a questionnaire
after completing a resting-state scan, with the intention of
characterizing the general qualities of their experience while
in the scanner (Delamillieure et al., 2010). However, the
complex, multimodal, and dynamic patterning of the stream of
consciousness is likely to vary considerably in its qualities from
moment to moment within one resting-state scan, as well as from
scan to scan and from individual to individual. Furthermore,
resting-state questionnaires (like all questionnaires) are limited
by the particular questions they ask and the particular way in
which they ask them. As a result, such retrospective attempts
to describe general qualities of a relatively long period of
consciousness are not likely to provide accurate or particularly
detailed descriptions of experience in the resting state (Hurlburt
et al., 2015; Van Calster et al., 2017).
Some have sought to overcome the retrospectiveness problem
by presenting random probes and soliciting reports immediately
thereafter. For example, Christoff et al. (2009) had participants
in the scanner perform a boring task and, when signaled,
report whether their attention was focused on the task or
otherwise. However, while ameliorating the retrospectiveness
problem, this quantitative probing method has shortcomings of
its own, principally that the response options available in such
a paradigm are highly constrained: for example, the Christoff
et al. (2009) participants responded only to two Likert-type
scales, one asking the degree to which attention was focused on
the task and the other whether they had been aware of where
their attention was focused. Raij and Riekki (2017) recently
employed a more sophisticated probe methodology to explore
neural activations during spontaneous thinking, with responses
based on an answer tree derived from previous research.
However, the response procedure was complex (involving two
separate button-presses) and probes occurred at fairly frequent
intervals (between 12 and 40.5 s apart), meaning that the
resting state was frequently disrupted by a probe. In all such
studies, it is possible that a participant’s responses on such
self-report scales may depend more on presuppositions about
experience than on experience itself (Hurlburt and Heavey,
2015).
Methodological limitations like these have meant that the
phenomenology of resting-state cognition has not been described
in detail, and that key questions about resting-state cognition
remain largely unanswered. For example, some have proposed
that the alternation between task-centered cognition and mind-
wandering involves an organized and periodic switching between
neural networks involved in processing information from the
environment and those that manipulate internally generated
information (Spreng et al., 2010, 2013; Smallwood et al., 2012).
If this is the case, it should be reflected in the phenomenology of
the resting-state experience, and it should in principle be possible
to measure concurrent changes to areas of the DMN and other
networks during moments of internally and externally guided
attention.
One focus of such studies has been to model how the
human cognitive system can move between psychological states
that are focused on the external environment and those that
involve internal generation of material. Of particular interest is
the positing of a decoupling mechanism that frees the agent
from acting solely on immediate, environmentally triggered
stimuli. Several authors (Spreng et al., 2010, 2013; Smallwood
et al., 2012) have proposed a model of stimulus-independent
thought that depends on cooperation between the DMN
(which provides autobiographical information relevant to self-
generated, internally focused thought, and which incorporates
lower precuneus, superior and inferior anterior medial frontal
regions, and posterior lateral parietal cortices) and the frontal-
parietal network (FPN, which is drawn on to buffer internal
trains of thought against disruption by external stimuli,
and which incorporates rostrolateral prefrontal cortex, middle
frontal gyrus, anterior insula, dorsal anterior cingulate cortex,
precuneus, and anterior inferior parietal lobule; Spreng et al.,
2010). Anatomically situated between the DMN and the
dorsal attention network (DAN), the FPN’s posited role is to
collaborate selectively with two networks that are focused on
internally- and externally-focused cognitions, respectively. This
“switching” model predicts that internally focused cognitions
will be associated with activation in elements of the DMN
and FPN, whereas externally focused cognitions will be
associated with activation in elements of the FPN and
DAN.
Two studies to date have used fMRI to examine the brain
activation associated with internal and external cognitions.
Vanhaudenhuyse et al. (2011) reported a linear relation between
activity in DMN-related regions and participants’ ratings
of intensity of internal awareness. They randomly beeped
participants in the scanner and had them rate their state of
awareness by pressing one of four buttons labeled strongly
external, moderately external, moderately internal, and strongly
internal. The random beeps (and thence the ratings) were
presented, on average, every 20 s (range 3–30 s). However, such
a rapid, repetitive rating procedure may substantially interfere
with the natural resting state. Furthermore, the procedure may
place participants in a strongly internal stance—they are required
to monitor their experience essentially continuously because
they know that they will have to rate their internal state at
some time in the next 3–30 s. As a result, it can be argued
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that participants in such a situation have one of two equally
undesirable options: they can try to ignore their experiment-
imposed internal stance when rating their internal/external
state (perhaps this is what the authors intended them to
do); or they can rate the internality of the (experiment-
imposed) state (but Hurlburt et al., 2016, have suggested
that states elicited on demand may be psychologically and
neurophysiologically different from states that spontaneously
occur). Furthermore, the Vanhaudenhuyse et al. (2011) study
defined the constructs (with “external” defined as “the perception
of environmental sensory stimuli” and “internal” as “all
environmental stimuli-independent thoughts,” p. 570), but
did not seek to overcome presuppositions that participants
might have regarding such constructs. Hurlburt (Hurlburt,
2011; Caracciolo and Hurlburt, 2016) has claimed that such
presuppositions are powerful.
A second study employing experience sampling during
fMRI is that of Van Calster et al. (2017), who used a
think-aloud procedure in conjunction with cued experience
sampling to generate categories of experience for which neural
activations were established in a separate sample. Results
showed a fluctuation in DAN activity as a function of
subjective reports of attentional control, suggesting that this
network is involved in recruitment of attentional processes
during spontaneous cognition. Four categories of experience
were derived for use in the fMRI investigations: absence of
experience (blankness of mind), perceptions, stimulus-dependent
thoughts, and stimulus-independent thoughts. Drawbacks of this
methodology include a long duration of sampled experience
(10 s before the probe), a complex response methodology
involving the use of multiple fingers, categorization on the basis
of frequency (thus not allowing for idiographic descriptions),
relatively frequent sampling (probes at intervals between 30
and 60 s), and, perhaps most importantly, the fact that
the distinction between a “thought” and a “perception”
was not defined in this study. Hurlburt (Hurlburt and
Schwitzgebel, 2007) reported that people apply the word
“thinking” or “thought” to an extraordinary variety of inner
experience, ranging from inner speech to feelings to sensory
awareness.
The methods used in such studies force a categorization of
experience, implying that experience is a unitary phenomenon,
so that any particular experience is capable of being assigned
as focused either on the environment or on inner processes,
but not both simultaneously. There is reason to question this
unitary-experience assumption. William James (1901), in his
pioneering examination of the nature of consciousness, noted
that any particular moment of experience is a dynamic composite
of multiple streams. James’s insight is borne out by a large
body of phenomenological data showing that experience can
take multiple foci simultaneously. Hurlburt (2011) has found
that people who have multiple experience, as discovered by
Descriptive Experience Sampling (DES), often (perhaps usually)
have no inkling of its existence prior to the DES explorations.
The study that provides the substrate for the present
analyses was motivated by these and other methodological
concerns. In that resting-state fMRI study (Kühn et al., 2014a;
Hurlburt et al., 2015, 2016), we investigated experience during
the resting state in a situation that (a) minimizes the disturbance
of the resting state; (b) draws on a methodology capable of
doing justice to the multiplicity of experience; and (c) provides
an effective strategy for bracketing presuppositions about the
relevant constructs.
We employed descriptions produced by the DES method
(Hurlburt, 1997, 2011; Hurlburt and Akhter, 2006; Hurlburt
and Heavey, 2006), an iterative procedure whereby participants
develop expertise in responding to random beeps by making
notes on the experience that was ongoing immediately before the
beep, and subsequently exploring these moments of experience
in detail with an investigator. In previous work, we have shown
that DES can fruitfully be integrated with fMRI (Kühn et al.,
2014a), and that it can provide richer descriptions of experience
in the resting state than have previously been possible (Hurlburt
et al., 2015). Hurlburt (2011) described the data elicited using
this technique as providing a “high fidelity” account of inner
experience, in the sense that DES aims to provide a clear and
(largely) unbiased account of participants’ inner experiences.
Our participants were beeped four times during a 25 min
scan (for an average inter-beep interval of about 400 s
(20 times longer than Vanhaudenhuyse et al.’s (2011) 20 s
average), thus substantially lessening the interference caused
by the task. Furthermore, our aim was to acquire high-
fidelity descriptions of experience, whatever that experience
might be (in particular, neither our participants nor we
were focused particularly on the internality/externality of their
experience). Participants had been trained using an iterative
procedure (Hurlburt, 2009, 2011) to aid in the bracketing
of presuppositions and lessen misunderstandings between
the participant and the investigators. In this way, we had
generated 180 detailed descriptions of experiences that were
collected from quasi-randomly selected (“beeped”) moments
during resting-state scans, along with their associated fMRI
data, all acquired within a standard resting-state paradigm
as undisturbed by experimenter-imposed structure (that is,
as “pristine”; Hurlburt, 2011) as the current state of the art
allows.
The present article presents two re-analyses of these data with
a specific focus on examining assumptions about the unitary
nature of individual moments of experience. We selected an
aspect of experience that has featured prominently in previous
research, namely the internal/external model of mind-wandering
as switching between internal and external foci. Both analyses
began with detailed descriptions of samples of resting-state
experience that had been generated by DES (Hurlburt et al.,
2015). In the first analysis, we considered only those samples
where experience was (according to our raters) indeed unitary
and was unambiguously focused either internally or externally;
then we asked how that internality or externality related to neural
activations in those samples. This was essentially a replication of
the earlier work by Vanhaudenhuyse et al. (2011) and Christoff
et al. (2009), except that we did not assume that experience was
unitary and either internal or external, but instead considered
only those cases where the DES procedure (putatively) established
that experience was indeed unitary and either internal or external.
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However, that analysis omitted samples that are potentially of
more interest: those where there were two or more simultaneous
streams of experience, one (or more) internal and another
external; those where there was one stream of experience that
had simultaneously an internal and an external focus; and
those where internality/externality of experience was either
ambiguous or irrelevant. We therefore conducted a second
analysis that explored how the model accounted for those
samples.
Our procedure was as follows. First, three independent raters
coded our existing resting-state beeped-experience descriptions
according to whether they were internally or externally focused
(see Section “Materials and Methods” below). Limiting ourselves
to experiences that could be unanimously classified, we
contrasted (Analysis 1) the activations associated with experience
samples classified as internally focused with those classified as
externally focused, thus allowing a comparison of our results to
the switching model of mind-wandering described above.
Then we recoded moments of experience for which there
had not been unanimous agreement among the raters about an
internal vs. external focus. Such situations were characterized
by the division of experience between the internal and external
worlds. In terms of the “switching” model of Spreng et al.
(2010) and Smallwood et al. (2012; see above), the simplest
way of accounting for such moments of experience would be
in terms of simultaneous activation of both the DAN (focused
on external experience) and the DMN (focused on internal
experience). To assess this possibility, we attempted to predict
(Analysis 2), from the fMRI activation data, internal–external
ratings for the beeped experiences for which there had not been
unanimous agreement. Such multiple or ambiguous experiences
would be unclassifiable under standard categorical systems.
Here, we draw on the richer nature of our experiential data
(relative to previous studies) to test neural activation in such
cases.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
As this study involves further analysis of data from a previous
experiment, we highlight the method here and refer the reader to
Hurlburt et al. (2016) for a complete description.
Participants
Five native English-speaking participants who currently lived
in Berlin participated on the basis of informed consent and
with ethical committee approval according to the Declaration
of Helsinki. All participants had normal or corrected-to-
normal vision. No participant had a history of neurological,
major medical, or psychiatric disorder, as determined by
a questionnaire and the Mini-International Neuropsychiatric
Interview (Sheehan et al., 1998; Ackenheil et al., 1999).
The participants (three females, two males) had a mean
age of 22.4 (ranging from 18 to 30) and all but one
(male) were right-handed. The images from the left-handed
subject were reversed, because we had evidence indicating
that this participant activated right inferior frontal gyrus
more strongly then left inferior frontal gyrus during a
language generation task, i.e., the reverse of the pattern of
lateralization typically seen in right-handers (Hurlburt et al.,
2016).
Measures
MRI Scanning
Images were collected on a 3T Magnetom Trio MRI scanner
system (Siemens Medical Systems, Erlangen, Germany) using
a 32-channel radio frequency head coil using a standard
echo planar imaging (EPI) sequence. Images were obtained
using a three-dimensional T1-weighted magnetization-
prepared gradient-echo sequence (MPRAGE) based on
the ADNI protocol1 (repetition time [TR] = 2,500 ms;
echo time [TE] = 4.77 ms; TI = 1,100 ms, acquisition
matrix = 256× 256× 176, flip angle = 7◦; 1 mm× 1 mm× 1 mm
voxel size). Functional images were collected using a T2∗-
weighted EPI sequence sensitive to blood oxygen level
dependent (BOLD) contrast (TR = 2,000 ms, TE = 30 ms,
image matrix = 64 × 64, FOV = 216 mm, flip angle = 80◦, voxel
size 3 mm3 × 3 mm3 × 3 mm3, 36 axial slices).
fMRI data were analyzed using SPM8 software (Wellcome
Department of Cognitive Neurology, London, United Kingdom),
with commonly used preprocessing steps including slice time and
motion correction, coregistration, normalization, and smoothing
(see Kühn et al., 2014a, for details).
Descriptive Experience Sampling
Descriptive experience sampling was performed as described in
Hurlburt and Heavey (2006), Hurlburt (2011), and elsewhere.
DES is primarily an idiographic procedure, aiming at high fidelity
apprehensions of inner experience phenomena regardless of
whether those phenomena are common across individuals or
idiosyncratic to particular individuals. The method produces a
written description of each experience of each individual at each
random beep.
Procedure
Each participant was iteratively trained in 4 days of DES
sampling in the participant’s natural environment (see Hurlburt
et al., 2016, for a full description). We then continued DES
sampling in nine 25-min sessions in the scanner with resting-
state instructions: “Please relax, without falling asleep and do
keep your eyes open.” In each session at four quasi-random
times, the participant received a DES beep through a headphone.
Immediately following each session, the participant participated
in a DES expositional interview conducted by RH and at least one
and as many as four additional interviewers, usually including SK
and sometimes CF or BA-D.
Within 24 h of each DES expositional interview, one of
the interviewers wrote a description of each of that day’s
samples. These descriptions were then circulated to the others for
comment, with any disagreement resolved or left as an explicit
disagreement (see Hurlburt et al., 2017, for a discussion of this
procedure), usually within 48 h of the original interview. It is
1www.adni-info.org
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these descriptions that serve as the starting point for the present
study.
This sequence (25-min fMRI scan/four beeps followed
by jotted notes/expositional interview/written description with
commentary) was repeated eight more times, typically spread
over 5 days, resulting in nine scanner sessions and 9 × 4 = 36
written descriptions of random samples of experience occurring
in 9 × 25 = 225 min of fMRI scanning for each participant. In
all, therefore, there were 5 × 36 = 180 sampled moments with
associated written DES descriptions and time-locked fMRI data.
Internal/External Coding of Experience
Samples
Three of the authors (BA-D, CF, and RH) independently coded
each of the 180 samples according to whether it could be
confidently judged as involving either internally or externally
generated experiences. The ratings were then compared across
coders and three subsets were identified: internal (those samples
for which all three raters unanimously agreed that the experience
was internal; n = 65); external (those samples that were
unanimously rated as external; n = 46); and non-consensus (those
for which there had not been unanimous agreement; n = 69).
Consideration of the non-consensus samples suggested that the
main reason for the lack of consensus was that the samples
contained both internal and external elements; this might provide
an opportunity to examine neural activations when attention was
focused neither exclusively internally nor exclusively externally.
The non-consensus samples were then subjected to forced-
choice coding by the same raters. Each rater made a forced-choice
judgment about whether each sample was predominantly internal
(−1) vs. external (+1) and assigned a confidence score (between
1 and 10) for each judgment. These judgment and confidence
scores were then multiplied together to form a continuous
variable (from −10 if confidently internal to +10 if confidently
external), and the mean taken across raters. This “composite”
score, marking both internality/externality and confidence for
each beeped experience, then became the dependent variable in
the subsequent analyses. (See Table 1 for examples of samples
unanimously classified as internal or external, and the Discussion
for examples of non-consensus samples).
Whole-Brain Analysis
The statistical analyses were performed using a general linear
model (GLM) approach. Regressors were built coding the
(unanimous) internal and external events at the time of the
audible beep. These vectors were convolved with a canonical
hemodynamic response function (HRF) and its temporal
derivatives.
Taking into account the standard 3–5 s delay in the
hemodynamic response allowed us to model events in the brain
in the seconds immediately prior to the moment of the beep.
In a previous publication on the same fMRI data set (Hurlburt
et al., 2016) we also tried modeling with stick functions 1 and 2 s
before the beep onset and durations of 1–2 s for the “window”
surveyed at each beep; these results were very similar, therefore
we decided that modeling the event at the time of the beep is
TABLE 1 | Examples of sampled experiences classified as internal, external, and
social.
Internal
Jack had been singing to himself the Beach Boys “Good Vibrations.” At
the moment of the beep he is saying in his inner voice “good vibrations” in
a declarative tone. Perhaps there is some musicality involved, but
probably he is just saying what he had previously been singing.
Susan is visualizing very strongly a scene from yesterday: her boyfriend
and his mother on a hillside next to the lake. She sees him in the shade,
her in the sun, and (blurry) a sea of people around them. Before the beep
she had been thinking that they look like monkeys, the way monkeys
perch in family groups. Now she is somehow saying to herself in her own
voice something like they do look like monkeys. There are words “floating
around” but they don’t make full sentences. This is something like implied
words rather than actually experienced words.
External
Lara is repeatedly blinking her eyes. She feels the blinking happen—that
is, she does not experience herself as doing this blinking. Simultaneously
she is hearing two tones coming from the scanner—one high, one low.
She also sees her hand holding the pen, not noticing anything in
particular. [Note that this is a multiple-strand experience, but all the
strands are external.]
Otto is in a long blink, which he both feels in his eyes and sees blackness.
He is simultaneously aware of his right arm, including the place that it
touches the desk. He is simultaneously aware of his breathing—his chest
rising, air in his nostrils, and the sound of the breathing.
Social (note: all previously classified by at least one rater as internal)
Lara is seeing herself saying “which a lot of them are very.” She sees
herself incompletely detailed, but she sees herself in a third-person
perspective from the front, upper torso wearing a white shirt and she has
her hair up [today she’s wearing her hair down]. The words seem to be
part of a larger sentence that preceded what she has written down and
then would have gone on except for the interruption of the beeper. She is
not sure who she is talking to, but the content is related to the beeper
study.
Susan has been imagining herself bartering in Marrakesh, and she speaks
to the seller in German: “Was kostet das?” Now she is innerly saying silly
in a weird questioning tone that conveys her wonderment that she would
speak in German to a person who probably doesn’t speak German.
the most adequate procedure. Additionally, the six rigid body
movement parameters were also included in the single subject
GLM. Differential t-contrasts between (unanimous) internal vs.
external events were calculated per subject and taken to group
level analysis. On the second level, these differential t-contrast
images were entered into a one-sample t-test. The whole-brain
results were thresholded at p < 0.001, and to correct for multiple
comparisons a significant effect was reported when the volume
of the cluster was greater than the Monte Carlo simulation
determined minimum cluster size above which the probability of
type I error was <0.05 (Ward, 2000). The resulting maps were
overlaid onto a normalized T1 weighted MNI template (colin27),
and the coordinates reported correspond to the MNI coordinate
system.
ROI Analysis
From the regions resulting from the whole-brain contrasts we
extracted percent signal changes for each region of interest (ROI)
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identified in the whole-brain analysis and for each individual and
each sampled experience separately.
K-means clustering was then used to classify the non-
consensus experiences based on percent signal changes in brain
regions observed in the contrast of unanimous internal vs.
external experiences. The objective of the k-means algorithm
is to divide observations into clusters based on similarity of
the cases (based on Euclidean distances) within each cluster
so that the within-cluster sum of squares is minimized.
In order to account for the fact that several data points
were generated by the same subject and because there is,
to our knowledge, no special repeated-measures approach
to k-means clustering, we subtracted each subject’s mean
from its respective ROI data. To explore whether the classes
suggested by the k-means clustering algorithm related to
our original internal/external coding, we ran a linear mixed-
effects model predicting the composite rating from the
k-means-derived clustering while accounting for repeated
measures.
RESULTS
Analysis 1: Contrasting Internal and
External Samples
When performing an internal > external contrast on the
(65 + 46 = ) 111 samples that were rated unanimously as being
either internal or external, we observed activation in bilateral
dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC; 15, 32, 46; −12, 23, 52;
BA 8, 9, 32), precuneus (6,−37, 37; BA 23), and left parietal cortex
(−42,−61, 34; BA 7, 40) (p < 0.001, cluster corrected, Figure 1).
For the reverse contrast (external > internal), no brain regions
survived the threshold.
Analysis 2: Predicting Forced-Choice
Internal–External Classifications From
the fMRI Data
We used a clustering approach to explore novel fMRI-
data-driven ways to classify the (180–65–46 =) 69 non-
consensus samples, treating the composite score (marking
both internality/externality and confidence for each beeped
experience) as a continuous variable in the regression. In
order to predict these composite scores, we applied k-means
clustering to the subject-demeaned percent signal changes
extracted from each of the four ROIs identified in our
original whole-brain analysis (right dmPFC, left dmPFC,
precuneus, left parietal). We ran a linear mixed-effects model
to predict the composite score, while accounting for the
fact that multiple experiences came from the same subjects.
The model was significant, F(1, 4.54) = 8.656, p = 0.036,
indicating that the ROIs derived from those samples where
internality/externality could be identified with confidence were
also useful in using fMRI data to predict a continuous
internality/externality rating in those other samples where
our raters were less confident in their internality/externality
classification.
FIGURE 1 | Results of the whole-brain contrast of unanimously classified
internal vs. external samples (p < 0.001, cluster size corrected).
Subsidiary Analysis: Post hoc Coding of
Social Content of “Internal” Experiences
Initial inspection of the regions highlighted by the
internal > external contrast suggested that the region of
activity in dmPFC was more dorsal than typical in a classic
DMN pattern. One possible explanation is that activation
in this region is an artifact of a confounding of social and
internal/external aspects of experience. Our reasoning was as
follows: internally directed experiences are likely to be sometimes
social (involving other people) and sometimes non-social,
because such experiences (thoughts, memories, daydreams, etc.)
are not constrained by the physical environment of the scanner.
In contrast, externally directed experiences in the scanner are
highly likely to be non-social (about sounds and sensations in
the scanner) and—given the physical constraints of the scanner,
safety procedures around magnetic fields, etc.—unlikely to
involve other people (unless, for example, people are visible
in the scanner mirror). The dmPFC and precuneus are brain
regions that have been implicated in social cognition (Kennedy
and Adolphs, 2012; Mars et al., 2012; Schilbach et al., 2012). Our
findings of internal > external dmPFC/precuneus activation
might thus be an artifact of the social nature of internally directed
experiences.
We therefore tested the possibility that the activation
for internal experiences might reflect social processing. The
same coders now rated the 65 unanimously classified internal
experiences according to whether they were “social” (that is,
involved other people). We coded events as social when at
least one of the raters indicated that the event contained social
elements. Of the 65 samples that had been unanimously classified
as internal, 57 were coded as social (for examples, see Table 1);
the remaining (65−57 =) 8 were designated “nonsocial.”
Next, we ran linear mixed-effect models with percent signal
change in each of the ROIs as the dependent variable; as a
predictor, we used a variable coding the social vs. non-social
rating. In order to account for the fact that multiple experiences
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from each subject were entered into the analysis, we additionally
added a subject variable. None of the linear mixed-effects models
were significant, F(1, 66) < 1.58, p > 0.211, meaning that we did
not find evidence that the activation in either bilateral dmPFC
and/or precuneus can be explained by a systematic difference in
the social content of experience.
DISCUSSION
The analyses presented here were designed to investigate how
experience in the resting state can vary between internal,
external, and multiple simultaneous streams. We used an existing
neuroimaging dataset (Kühn et al., 2014a; Hurlburt et al., 2015,
2016) in which we have 180 quasi-random (“beeped”) DES
apprehensions of participants’ first-person experience, each time-
locked with their ongoing (MRI-measured) brain activity. In
Analysis 1, we (i) considered those beeped experiences that
were unanimously classified by three independent raters as
being experientially internal (n = 65) or external (n = 46), (ii)
modeled the corresponding BOLD response, and (iii) contrasted
the modeled response for internal and external moments of
experience. Whole-brain analysis revealed significantly higher
brain activity in right dmPFC, left dmPFC, precuneus, and left
parietal cortex for internal compared with external experiences.
All four brain regions identified in our internal > external
contrast are part of the DMN (Buckner et al., 2008) and have been
proposed as being deactivated during active task performance
as compared to fixation (Gusnard and Raichle, 2001). Our
finding thus supports existing models of resting-state cognition
in demonstrating activation of the DMN during experiences
that are internally generated. This support is important for two
related reasons. First, the experiences we rated as being internally
focused are indeed (as evidenced by the DES procedure and
detailed in the phenomenological descriptions) experientially
disconnected from the proximal environment; that is, they are
genuinely (in terms of experience) “internal.” This constitutes
a substantial advance over previous studies that have defined
internality only in the negative, as self-reported failure to attend
to an ongoing (external) cognitive task. In instances of such
failure to attend, the participant’s attention might be drifting from
one external focus (the task) to an equally external experience
(e.g., to the noise of the scanner). In such cases, mind-wandering
is not a failure of externality (resulting in a shift to internality)
but rather a shift in externality from one external thing (the
task) to another. To put it another way, mind-wandering has
frequently been conceptualized as an involuntary allocation of
external attention (e.g., McVay and Kane, 2010), rather than being
intrinsically about internally focused experiences. In contrast,
our internally focused experiences, as described by DES, are
consistent with other characterizations of mind-wandering as
allowing “freedom from immediacy” (Shadlen and Gold, 2004),
liberating cognition from the pressure to respond to external
stimuli in the environment.
Second, the shifts from external to internal and vice versa
for our participants were events that took place in their natural
environments (at least as natural as resting in a scanner can be).
This constitutes a substantial advance over previous studies that
have measured internal/external shifts in situations contrived
by experimenters to be as explicitly boring as possible. In a
report on the same sample that focused on a contrast between
experimenter-elicited and spontaneous inner speech, Hurlburt
et al. (2016) showed that the brain activations in on-demand
situations may be different from activations in natural situations.
Thus our first analysis provides clear support for the
idea that mind-wandering involves a decoupling of external
stimuli, and that its phenomenology can be specifically linked
to DMN activation. This is congruent with the findings of
Vanhaudenhuyse et al. (2011) showing a linear relation between
DMN-related activity and intensity of internal awareness.
However, only 111 of our 180 descriptions of experience (62%)
could be unanimously classified into one of the two categories
of internally oriented or externally oriented experience. The
remaining 69 descriptions (38%) included multiple trains of
thought (some internal, some external), elements of both
internally and externally guided attention within unitary
experiences, or experiences that were ambiguous or otherwise
impossible to specify with regard to internality or externality.
Such experiences are generally not contemplated by theories of
mind-wandering.
Rather than eliminating these samples from the analysis
or simply treating them as contributing to error variance
(as must other analyses), we were able to draw on the
phenomenological richness of DES reports to examine neural
activations when attention was focused neither exclusively
internally nor exclusively externally. In Analysis 2, we accordingly
reversed the direction of explanation between levels of analysis.
Rather than beginning with phenomenological descriptions
and using them to characterize associated brain processes,
we began with the regions of interest resulting from the
whole-brain contrasts for our unanimously coded samples
and used them to examine whether we could predict the
phenomenology of the remaining samples for which there
was not unanimous agreement. The model was successful in
predicting our raters’ composite ratings (accounting both for
forced-choice categorizations and for confidence) on the basis
of the neural data. We have thus shown that the complex,
multiple nature of spontaneous human experience described
by William James and others can be brought into scientific
inquiry. Specifically, we were able to link neural activations
identified in established models of resting-state cognition to the
phenomenological richness of complex, multi-layered moments
of experience that would not have been amenable to standard
mind-wandering methodologies.
Before considering the wider implications of our findings,
we return to the observation that our dmPFC cluster was more
dorsal than the dmPFC areas typically associated with the DMN.
Because the localization is within the proximity of brain regions
reported in social cognition (Schilbach et al., 2012), we conducted
a control analysis (Section “Subsidiary Analysis: Post-hoc Coding
of Social Content of “Internal” Experiences”), motivated by the
observed activations and theoretical considerations, to exclude
the possibility that the activation difference was an artifact of
the likely greater sociality of internal vs. external experiences
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when sampled in an MRI environment. Our analysis suggested
that this was not a likely explanation: the social content of
sampled experiences did not predict brain activity in dmPFC.
An alternative explanation suggests that dmPFC may be involved
in an active disengagement from stimuli. This speculation is
based on the observation that dmPFC is involved in voluntary
inhibition (Filevich et al., 2012). Although to date only a
few studies have investigated these endogenously generated
inhibitory processes, the idea has a long heritage (Libet et al.,
1983; Descartes, 1989). Interestingly, several of these studies
suggest an involvement of dmPFC in the process of voluntarily
suppressing actions (Brass and Haggard, 2007; Kühn et al., 2009)
and emotions (Kühn et al., 2014b) as well as cigarette craving
(Brody et al., 2007), which has led to the notion that dmPFC may
be involved in the exertion of self-control (Lynn et al., 2014).
Extending that idea leads to the speculation that our stronger
activation in dmPFC during internal experiences may reflect an
active disengagement from the stimuli in the proximal external
environment.
We also note that we report neural activation differences
between the two classifications of experience based on
an internal > external contrast. The opposite contrast,
external > internal, showed no significant differences. We
speculate that this pattern of findings may suggest that there
is no unitary externally focused cognition—that various kinds
of externally directed cognition will each involve different
sensory modalities, each with its own cortical localizations (to
the different sensory cortices), so that activations in different
modality-specific regions will cancel out in an external > internal
contrast. Replication of this analysis with greater statistical power
to interpret the null finding would be desirable.
In comparison with other studies that have assessed mind-
wandering using versions of an attention-to-task paradigm (e.g.,
Christoff et al., 2009), the present study is distinctive in tying
neural activations in the resting state to specific phenomenology.
We have argued elsewhere that the use of a method such as DES
in examining the phenomenology of the resting state avoids many
of the confounds that attend other mind-wandering paradigms
(Hurlburt et al., 2015). Our aim was to effect a closer integration
than previously possible between detailed phenomenology and
characterizations of neural activation, of a kind that researchers
in this field are increasingly recommending (Fell, 2013; Christoff
et al., 2016). We were able to do this in two directions: from
phenomenology to neural activation and vice versa, drawing
on the ability of DES, through the phenomenological richness
of its descriptions, to capture moments of experience focused
exclusively on neither the internal nor the external environment.
It is also clear from the foregoing report that only about two-
thirds (111/180) of experience samples could be unanimously
coded as having either an internal or an external focus. This
suggests that, phenomenologically, either the distinction between
internal and external focus is not as clear-cut as the dominant
“switching” model would suggest, or that our coding procedure
was not entirely adequate. To sort this through, we provide here
a few examples (using fictional names for our five participants)
where a simple characterization either as “internal” or “external”
would be problematic.
(1) How should the occurrence of multiple simultaneous
experiences be dealt with? The switching model holds
that, if an internal train is to exist, external trains must
be suppressed. (See our point above about a possible
explanation for our dmPFC activation.) Our use of DES,
however, repeatedly shows that two or more disparate
experiences can exist simultaneously in all combinations:
entirely in the external domain, entirely in the internal
domain, or distributed between external and internal. As
an example of the latter, Jane was focused on the geometry
of the scanner above her head, particularly on the distance
between the mirror and the ceiling of the scanner (an
external focus). Simultaneously she innerly saw the office
where the DES interviews had taken place, as if she had
been walking into the room. She saw the table and RH,
the people behind him, the computer, and so on. This
imaginary seeing is an internal focus.
[As an example of the coding method, one of the raters
coded this description external (confidence = 3), whereas
the other two coded it internal (confidence = 3 and 4). For
Analysis 2, we used the mean of these three ratings = (+3–
3–4)/3 =−1.33, i.e., internal with a low confidence rating.]
(2) Should the purposeful suppressing of an external
experience be considered internal or external? For
example, Otto was actively trying not to hear the noise
of the scanner. That is, he was not merely automatically
screening out the scanner noise (which he did successfully
on other occasions). Instead, he was hearing the noise
while at the same time actively trying not to attend to it.
In one manner of speaking, Otto’s hearing the scanner is
an external process—he hears the noise. But in another
manner of speaking Otto is engaged in an internally
created task—he is purposefully trying to inhibit the
hearing.
(3) Should an internally guided action, undertaken because
it produces an external (see #5) sensation, itself be
considered internal or external? For example, Susan was
purposefully running her thumb along a cut that had
healed on her finger. She was focusing on the roughness
of the cut (an external sensation), but was doing so to
perceive the resulting sensation (an internal intention).
(4) Should attending to a specific absence in the external
environment be considered internal or external? For
example, Jack was attending to the triangular shape of the
space between his thumbs (not to the thumbs themselves).
The thumbs themselves could be said to be external (as
objects in the external world), but the triangleness of
the space between them could be said to be an internal
creation, not an aspect of the external environment.
(5) Should interoceptive experiences, such as sensations in
the body, be considered internal or external? For example,
Lara felt an itch beneath her left ear. This could be said to
be internal (it takes place within the skin) but it could also
be said to be external: the sensation seems, on the basis
of a somewhat Cartesian distinction between mind/brain
and body, to be external to the experiencing being. In this
study, we agreed to treat such experiences as external.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 8 December 2018 | Volume 12 | Article 494
fnhum-12-00494 December 4, 2018 Time: 8:43 # 9
Fernyhough et al. DES and Resting State
On the face of it, experiences such as these five are problematic
for an external–internal switching model. One possible future
research avenue is to consider whether the switching model can
be modified to account for multiple streams of consciousness,
incorporating (for example) both internally and externally
generated cognitions. In such cases, one might expect to see DMN
activation in the absence of suppression of external stimuli by
the FPN. It is also possible that multiple streams of experience
are subserved by a different neural architecture to the FPN, a
possibility that could be tested by comparing neural signatures
of samples containing single vs. multiple streams of experience
(whether all internal, all external, or a combination). In addition,
the point made above about the dmPFC might entail that multiple
streams might involve reduced activation in the dmPFC region.
However, it must be recognized that such research avenues
may be impossible to travel using the forced-choice button-press
methods typically employed in scanner studies of experience.
We think it unreasonable to suppose, for example, that
Jane (of example #1 above) could be taught (within the
parameters of a single laboratory session) to notice disparate
simultaneous trains of experience (e.g., exteriorly examining
while simultaneously innerly seeing), to examine each train for its
internality/externality, and to push a button if the trains differed
in their internality/externality. As a result, it seems to us that
studies that seek to take seriously the potential for extending the
(unitary) switching model will have to be willing to engage in
some kind of at-the-beep reporting that is of sufficiently high
fidelity that outside observers can rate its internality/externality.
In part because of the need for training, such studies will be quite
labor-intensive.
The present study has several limitations. Because of the labor-
intensive nature of the study, the sample size was small, although
a large amount of phenomenological and neuroscientific data
was collected for each participant, meaning that we have an
acceptable level of power for our contrasts of interest. Despite
the relatively small number of participants, such in-depth data
can be used to demonstrate both confirmatory and surprising
results from the combination of DES and fMRI (e.g., Kühn
et al., 2014a). Nonetheless, the possibility that there was some
unknown peculiarity of our group of participants cannot be
ruled out. Our dataset was not sufficiently large to allow us
to separate out non-consensus samples that included multiple
trains of thought (some internal, some external), elements of
both internally and externally guided attention within single
experiences, or experiences that were ambiguous or otherwise
impossible to specify internality or externality.
Finally, our design did not enable us directly to investigate
the dynamic process, presumably unfolding over time, of
switching between internal and external streams, which is a key
component of the switching model (particularly as it relates to
the maintenance of a particular state of internal or external focus
over time). If one were able to capture such moments of transition
between modes of attention, other important hubs of resting-
state networks might also be apparent in our data. For example,
the anterior insula and anterior cingulate cortex have been
proposed to control salience-driven attentional switches between
the DMN and FPN during the resting state (Sridharan et al., 2008;
Wang et al., 2018). We observed no activation in these regions,
but if it were possible to code our experience samples for
recent or potential shifts in attention (essentially, moderations in
what is salient internally vs. externally) then recruitment of this
additional “salience network” may have become apparent (Seeley
et al., 2007).
CONCLUSION
We conclude by asking what the application of the labor-intensive
method of DES contributes to the cognitive neuroscience of
resting-state cognition that simpler, quicker methodologies do
not. We argued at the outset that understanding the complexities
of resting-state cognition requires nuanced phenomenological
descriptions of the kind that cannot be provided by probe
methods or questionnaires (see also Hurlburt et al., 2017).
In the present study, we show that methods such as DES
have the potential to unpick some of that complexity. We
have shown that a model involving simple switching between
internal and external focus cannot account for the (relatively
common, according to our data) states of experience where
both kinds of cognition are simultaneously ongoing. More
importantly, this study is the first to tie neural activations in the
resting state to specific, detailed phenomenology. Furthermore,
careful examination of that phenomenology (as in the five
examples above) opens important perspectives on phenomena
that need to be understood. Although demanding in terms
of resources, this study’s use of DES thus identifies valuable
questions for future research into the resting state and mind-
wandering.
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